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Introduction: metaphors and legal concepts
1 Metaphors are based upon an analogical cognitive device which consists in giving access
to an unknown domain – the “target domain” that I will call D2 – by using words specific
to a well-known domain – the “source domain” that I will call D1. As Trim points out:
[…] the whole nature of human conceptualisation appears to be based on analogy.
Perception of one entity recalls another. [Trim 2007: 18]
2 There lies the major function of  metaphors according to Lakoff  & Johnson.  They are
meant to ease the understanding of D2 by using words belonging to D1: “[…] its primary
function  is  understanding”  these  authors  say  [2003:  37]  before  adding  [2003:  160]:
“Metaphors […] are among our principal vehicles for understanding” (also see page 98).
The comparison between the two domains is elliptical though, as it is deprived of any
explicit sign of comparison. In order to work properly, it relies on elements that both
domains have in common. Some writers, such as Morier [1981: 670-671], speak of “pre-
existing similarities”. In this respect, Lakoff & Johnson state that:
A  metaphor  can  […]  only  describe  pre-existing  similarities.  It  cannot  create
similarities. [Lakoff & Johnson 2003: 154]
3 Aristotle already underlined this fact in The Poetics, chapter XXII, when he wrote that in
order to make a metaphor, one has to identify similarities. It follows that the access to D2
implies some degree of decoding work on the part of the recipient so that he/she can
identify these similarities.
4 If we look at this process in a positive way, reasoning by analogy allows one to have
access to an abstract domain by making it more concrete generally (a typical example of
this is talking about time in terms of space, as in “to take place” – the same goes in French
with the corresponding expression avoir lieu).
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5 If we look at it from a more critical point of view, reasoning by analogy implies taking
into account at least two elements which directly impact the way D2 is interpreted. First
of all, since D1 and D2 are necessarily distinct (there can be no metaphor if D1= D2)1, only
some aspects of D1 are used and, similarly, only some aspects of D2 are referenced. The
metaphor will use their common points in whole or in part. As a result, a metaphor is
always partial:
[…] the simplest of metaphors works according to this selection. [Morier 1981: 676]
6 Second of all, the reason why D1 has been chosen is not to be overlooked: not only is it
crucial to how the metaphor works but it also determines the way in which the reader/
recipient will understand D2. In other words, D1 works as a filter.
7 Three conclusions may be drawn from these statements. Firstly, the process by which
understanding  is  facilitated  is  indirect,  which  could  be  seen  as  an  interpretation
hardship,  yet “minimises the cognitive effort on the part of the recipient” [Cunillera
Domènech, 2010: 111] – however, the cognitive effort will depend entirely on who the
recipient is, whether or not they know the law and, if they do, what the extent of their
knowledge is. Secondly, any metaphor is likely to have an educational goal. Morier [1981:
673] describes such metaphors as being “utilitarian” and adds [1981: 673] that “[it is]
typical of the prosaic metaphor [to lead] from the unfamiliar to the familiar”. Finally, any
metaphor is conceptual. As summarised by Lakoff & Johnson:
[…] metaphor means metaphorical concept. [Lakoff & Johnson 2003: 7]
8 In this respect, it is not a mere stylistic effect or a speech ornament. In some instances,
metaphors can even carry a meaning that no other figure of speech would convey as
efficiently. It is no wonder that legal discourse is rife with metaphors as the law relies
heavily on concepts. Given the analogical process on which it is based, the metaphor is
indeed, in Berger’s words:
[…] particularly apt as a means of explaining complex or abstract ideas. [Berger
2002: 34]
9 Some writers have even claimed that it cannot do without them:
[…]  metaphors  are  strictly  unavoidable  in  legal  language  because  they  are
constitutive of legal reasoning. [Morra, Rossi & Bazzanella 2006: 141]
10 Galonnier [2000: §12] confirms this standpoint when he quotes Klinck [1991: 360-361]:
“legal  reasoning  is  itself  metaphorical»  because  it  rests  on  an  inductive  (analogical)
approach. Indeed, they achieve many things that are very useful to the law: thanks to
them, abstract,  complex notions can be made more concrete,  in particular through a
process of reification – as in “to break the law” – or of personification (“the eye of the
law”, “the arm of the law”, “the mouth of the law”, “the body of case law”, “Lady Justice”
to name but a few examples). As Trim noticed:
[…] studies on cross-cultural models […] suggest that physiological metaphors are
likely to have universal trends. [Trim 2007: 33]
11 He adds, a few pages further:
[personification] can be transmitted from one culture to the next. [Trim 2007: 47]
12 Not  surprisingly,  the  use  of  body references  in  legal  French is  common too.  In  this
respect, Houbert [2008: 1] shows how the expression “the eye of the law” reminds one of
the maxim l’oeil de la loi veille and how “the mouth of the law” conjures up Montesquieu’s
famous quote le juge est la bouche de la loi (“the judge is the mouth of the law”). However, it
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must be specified that metaphors being culture-bound, similar metaphors found in two
different languages are not necessarily interpreted in the same way.
13 This type of metaphor – that Lakoff & Johnson [2003: 26] call “ontological metaphors” –
presents ideas or events as if they were entities and is found quite often in English for
Law. Nonetheless, other types of metaphor are used, such as those linked to warfare (I
will return to this later) or those related to agriculture, climate and water (nature more
generally speaking), to mention a few recurrent instances. What is striking is that key
legal notions are regularly referred to metaphorically, especially when creations – that is
to  say  abstract  things  –  are  concerned.  For  instance,  the  law speaks  of  “intellectual
property”/propriété intellectuelle. This is not specific to the law, though. Lakoff & Johnson
[2003: 75] underline the fact that abstract creations are often made more concrete by
means of a metaphor that presents them as objects (“His writings are products of his
fertile imagination”) or as living entities (“The theory of relativity first saw the light in
1905”).  The  objective,  we  can  assume,  is  that  such  notions  will  be  understood  and
remembered more easily.  After all,  like most specialist fields, the law is complex and
technical. Unlike some of them, its language has to be accessible – not necessarily, and
certainly not only, to the average person as we will see later. One undeniable asset of
metaphors  is  that  they  can  work  as  efficient  mnemonic  devices  that  help  lawyers
themselves get a grasp of, and memorise, the gist of a notion.2 Indeed, the vocabulary
they use benefits from two powerful advantages: firstly, it is familiar, and secondly, it
often triggers images (which is essential as specialists have shown that around 80% of
communication comes across visually). A third element increases this cognitive impact:
the analogical process strikes the mind, all  the more so when it is surprising and/or
symbolical.
14 However, metaphors do not carry intelligibility virtues only. To begin with, they can be a
subtle way to manipulate people. Gingras [1996: 160] specifies that they can be seen as
“fallacies”, that is to say discursive devices aimed at persuading. In this respect, I will
discuss the consequences brought about by some ontological metaphors, notably those of
personification.  Another  argument  that  reduces  their  pedagogic  power  is  that  any
metaphor implies various levels of interpretation: the choice of D1 has to be deciphered
in order to see what the metaphor is meant to offer, that is to say, what aspects of D2 are
brought to light. But catching the light is not always that obvious. Indeed, even though D1
is supposedly familiar, it does not entail that it is easy to interpret in all metaphors. What
they are meant to point out is not always evident. If the recipient does not have the
prerequisite knowledge,  some of them remain obscure and quite a number leave the
reader at a loss. Let us add that the bulk of metaphors in legal speech are “used” or
“dead” metaphors – as is generally the case in specialised languages – which, to some
writers, is an oxymoron as these so-called metaphors usually go unnoticed because they
belong to the legal lexicon3 – as opposed to “living” or “live” metaphors. As such, they
may have a specific entry in a dictionary. In other words, they are lexicalised. Why does
this  work against  them making them potentially  difficult  to  figure out?  Because the
context in which they are used is often less telling than that of the “living” metaphors,
they may turn out to be harder to decipher. Does that go against them being used in legal
language? Not necessarily as I  will  argue later. Nonetheless,  there is one feature that
clearly  speaks  against  them:  some  of  them  are  misleading,  either  because  they  are
ambiguous or because they impose a vision of the world that wrongly excludes any other
interpretation  (I  will  discuss  the  female  personification  of  the  Common Law in  this
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respect). I must specify that, in this paper, I will not take into account those metaphors
that generate so much incoherence that the message ends up being unintelligible (due to
a piling up of metaphors that create a bunch of unrelated images for instance).
15 Thus, do metaphors in English for Law clarify, distort or blur the message? I will first
show how metaphors are inherent to legal English and form a typical part of legal style.
However, they are more common in some types of legal text than in others. I did not find
many of them in contracts and they also seem to be few and far between in legislative
texts. But when they do appear, they play a decisive role as pointed out by Morra, Rossi &
Bazzanella [2006: 148]. Conversely, they are used fairly often in judgments. Berger makes
a very interesting point in this respect when he says that:
[…] the judicial opinion is not just a reflection of an opinion and a representation of
authority, but also a device that must persuade while maintaining the legitimacy of
the legal system. [Berger 2002: 30]
16 This is particular true when the ruling changes the law:
[…] it is at these moments of change that the need for effective language is most
exigent. […] a critical component of a judge’s toolbox is metaphor. [Berger 2002: 30]
17 Galonnier [2000: 2-5 & 8] draws a list of the most common metaphors in the former House
of  Lords’  rulings  and  confirms  that  their  large  use  answers  rhetorical  needs.  After
considering metaphors  in  legal  style,  I  will  look at  the  manipulative  and misleading
effects  that  some  metaphors  create  before  turning  to  how  obscure  some  may  be,
altogether blurring the message instead of enlightening it and seemingly defeating the
initial purpose. Yet, when that is the case, it would be hasty to conclude they should be
gotten rid of because of this apparent flaw.
 
1. Metaphors are constitutive of legal theory
18 Metaphors appear to be ingrained in legal  texts  and so closely intertwined with the
expression  of  legal  concepts  that  the  most  fundamental  of  them  are  conveyed
metaphorically.  Scholarship has shown that four major metaphor families seem to be
prominent  in  law:  those  bringing  to  mind  natural  elements,  those  that  conjure  up
warfare, those that speak of concepts in terms of objects and those that personify (other
aspects of everyday life are also used such as animals, sports, architecture, religion and
colours). In this way, the very essence of a major aspect of English law, the Common Law,
is symbolised through two recurrent metaphors based on nature – would it be far-fetched
to say it could be a way to imply that this system of law is “natural”?
 
1.1. The Common Law is a tree or a river
19 As a matter of fact, the tree metaphor is found in the Common Law system as well as in
the civil law system. In both cases, it highlights their idiosyncrasies thanks to the physical
characteristics of the tree (trunk, branches and roots) on the one hand, and to the fact
that it is a living organism on the other. In the Common Law system, the trunk stands for
the law that grew in England from 1066 on (William the Conqueror’s victory in Hastings
was the starting point of its gradual development in the land) and the branches represent
the offspring of this law through colonisation. In the countries where English settlers
exported their legal system, the latter evolved and matured in its own way (hence the
differences  between  English  law,  Canadian  law,  American  law  or  Australian  law  for
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instance) just like the branches of a tree grow from the trunk. In civil law systems, the
trunk represents Roman law from which legal systems branched out and spread into
continental Europe.4
20 Metaphorically, the roots are used similarly in both systems: they point out the fact that
they are – literally, one would be tempted to say – rooted in history, which establishes (not
to say “proves”) their legitimacy. This has not escaped Stirn, Fairgrieve & Guyomar [2006:
38] when they quote Lévy-Ullmann who stated that:
Positive law steadily goes back in history to times immemorial […] in England. One
can even say that the older a rule of law, the more weight it carries. Authority and
time go hand in hand.5 [Lévy-Ullmann 1999: n. pag.]
21 The roots are essential. They legitimate and hold together the whole system:
The branches grow indeed, but they have always grown from the same roots. [Sir
Pollock 1912: 9]
22 In this way, the tree metaphor puts forward three key aspects of the Common Law system
that anyone is able to identify, for they are simple and straightforward: first, it is strong,
stable and sturdy (the trunk); second, it is as solidly rooted in time as roots are in the
ground; and third,  it  is meant to evolve just like any living being – it  could even be
considered as able to live forever, which would make it virtually indestructible and would
endow the Common Law with eternal longevity (botanists know that any “dead” tree
harbours a whole variety of living beings: “A dead tree is still alive”, the Office National des
Forêts– French Forestry Commission – asserts on its website). In other words, the system
is here to stay. Sir Pollock [1912: 9] called it “permanent” as a matter of fact.
23 The river metaphor works just as efficiently as the tree metaphor and points to similar
characteristics. Judge Leibson stated in Hilen v. Hays, 673 S.W.2d. 713 (Kentucky Supreme
Court) that: “The common law is not a stagnant pool, but a moving stream.” In the same
way, a 1990 Texas Supreme Court judgment read: “the Common Law is not frozen or
stagnant, but evolving” (Reagan v.  Vaughn, 804 S.W.2d 463).  The water metaphor is also
commonly used to mention jurisdictions (“the two streams of jurisdiction, though they
run in the same channel, run side by side and do not mingle their waters”) or to speak of
certain laws (“safe harbor laws”).6 This metaphor is also a way to describe how the law
works. It is used to distinguish between Common Law and Equity, for instance. In this
respect, Loughlan mentions that:
Equity water [is] not mingling with common law water. [Loughlan 2006: 216]
24 In the same way, Lord Justice Laws wrote in his lecture “Our Lady of the Common Law”: 
The twin tides of Luxembourg and Strasbourg have swept Wednesbury7 away from
the foreshore of the law. But though the tides started across the channel their flood
is in the common law. [Lord Justice Laws 2012: 16, §27]
25 Fairgrieve & Muir Watt [2006: 26] insist that the river image is recurrent for two reasons:
first of all because it shows that the Common Law draws its legitimacy from the past, and
second of all because it evokes longevity and change, as exemplified by this quote from
Picard:
In  all  its  history,  Common Law changes  and yet  it  does  not  change.  Just  like  a
running river, it is always the same and yet it never is the same.8 [Picard 2003: n.
pag.]
26 These two metaphors highlight the same fundamental characteristics of the Common Law
– the tree metaphor is a little richer in this respect. Where literal language would need a
long explanation or description, one metaphor using a commonplace word (tree, river)
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conjures up three major aspects of a whole system of law by emphasizing its very essence.
The tree metaphor offers the additional advantage of being used to describe the three
major powers, namely, the «judicial branch», the “legislative branch” and the “executive
branch” (similarly, in France, we speak of “the branches of the law”). This is a definite
asset for a field as full of notions as the law is: metaphors vividly summarise in a few,
often visual words, complex ideas. This is why they are so useful – and some argue they
are necessary – in legal language. The very definition of the law itself paves the way for a
whole metaphoric field:
Law,  in  its  generic  sense,  is  a  body of  rules  of  action or  conduct  prescribed by
controlling authority, and having binding legal force. That which must be obeyed
and followed by citizens subject to sanctions or legal consequences in law. [Black’s
Law Dictionary, 1991: 612].
27 The “body” metaphor in the definition has not escaped the reader. The coercion element
is to be found in other definitions as well, such as that of Cornu in his Vocabulaire juridique
(page 290), which shows that it is not specific to one system of law.
28 It follows from the definition that non-compliance implies that someone’s rights have
been encroached upon, in which case the prejudice suffered must and will be redressed
with all the might of the law. This is where metaphors of warfare come in.
 
1.2. The judicial arena
29 “Lady Justice” is associated with four attributes that clearly evoke her main features –
why “her”? Because the probable reference is that of the Greek goddess of justice Themis
(also the goddess of order and social control) whose Latin equivalent was Iustitia (hence
the word “justice”). One of these attributes is a sword, another is a shield (the other two
are a blindfold and scales, respectively pointing out that her decisions are bias-free and
balanced – one thinks of the British civil rules of evidence which have to be “on a balance
of probabilities”). The sword punishes injustice – the goddess would pierce the hearts of
the unjust with it – and the shield protects the innocent who are unjustly attacked. No
wonder that the judicial rhetoric is crammed with war metaphors (a similar pattern is at
work  in  French  as  pointed  out  by  Picotte  [1995:  295-310]  for  instance).  The  court
procedure in Common Law countries is very telling in this respect: “Even its name begins
to tell the story: the adversary system” reads Thornburg’s opening sentence [1995: 225].
“In case law, academic literature, professional literature, and in popular culture, a trial is
a battle and the lawyer the client’s champion” this author adds before providing [1995:
233-236] a large variety of examples showing that trials are spoken of in terms of war. The
warfare semantic field is all the less surprising if we remember Mellinkoff’s assertion:
The law is a profession of words. [Mellinkoff, 1963: Preface, vii]
30 Everything is verbal in law, in particular in a court of law. And it just so happens that (in
Western cultures at least) debates are often evoked in terms of war. “We have a discourse
form structured in terms of battle”, Lakoff & Johnson [2003: 6] point out before adding:
“argument  is  war”.  The  examples  they  give  are  quite  revealing:  “Your  claims  are
indefensible”, “He attacked every weak point in my arguments”, “His criticisms were right on
target”,  “I  demolished his  argument”,  “I’ve  never  won an  argument  with him”,  “You
disagree?  Okay,  shoot!”,  “If  you  use  that  strategy,  he’ll  wipe  you  out”  [2003: 5-6].
Metaphorically, a court of law is a verbal battlefield. Arguments are attacked. Parties are
opponents who need a solid line of defence. The “defendant” is called this way because
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he/she has to defend himself/herself against accusations (the “attacks”). Victims need
the protection of the law. Society at large needs and wants to be protected. At some
unconscious level, people expect a winner and a loser. As in most sports. But the outcome
of a match does not compare to that of a trial. The protection provided by the law is a
double-edged weapon as protection seems to be inseparable from punishment. This is it: a
sword  and  a  shield.  Not  surprisingly,  these  two  attributes  are  used  quite  often,  as
exemplified by this quote from Berger:
Anglo-Canadian jurisprudence is  replete  with  metaphorical  constructions  of  the
law: estoppel is a ‘shield, not a sword’. [Berger 2002: 36]
31 From this point of view, metaphors say it all, or so it seems. They are also efficient tools
to help develop new legal concepts.
 
1.3. Metaphors spread the concept by spreading the word
32 One undeniable asset that metaphors have is that, whether “dead” or “living”, they are
powerful devices that help spread legal notions, from the most basic to the most complex.
For example, how come we know that the law is powerful? Not only because we see its
effect in everyday life when it has not been adhered to, but also because we speak of it in
terms that conjure up power. One of the most striking metaphors in this respect is the
one  that  says  that  the  law  is  a  person.  Not  any  person,  however,  although  all  the
attributes of a normal human being may be used such as the brain, the conscience (“the
conscience of Equity”, to mention but one example), the spirit or the body. For instance,
the law has arms. And if this arm is long (“long arm statute”, “the long arm of the law”)
then it reaches beyond a country’s boundaries. The law has eyes. But unlike any regular
human being, its (her?) eyes can see everything as if it/she were a kind of omniscient
power – reminiscence of the divine origin of Justice? Divine power aside, all these body
metaphors indicate that the law can act. I have noticed that among the nouns that refer
to body parts, «hand» is used in a remarkable number of phrases that, for the most part,
appear in legal contexts: “document under hand”, “hand and seal”, “first hand evidence”,
“second hand evidence” – interestingly enough, the equivalent French phrase refers not
to the sense of touch but to that of hearing (ouïe dire) – “delivery by hand”, “hand and
official seal”, “cash in hand”... The hand is precisely what gives human beings power over
their  environment.  If  we understand so  well  that  the  law has  powers  it  is  probably
because we can relate to how it  uses them, in the same way the ancient Greeks and
Romans could relate to their gods in a typical case of anthropomorphism. The law ends
up being thought of as a kind of supernatural human being – female, on the face of it, as
confirmed by the phrase “our Lady the Common Law” to which I will return.
33 Some metaphors have allegedly helped spread legal notions efficiently – and probably
more efficiently than a literal  description would have.  I  do not intend to give a full
appraisal of the metaphors which have successfully played this role. What I would like to
show, however, is how efficient they can be in this respect.
34 That of the “golden thread” is a case in point. It was coined by Viscount Sankey, a Judge
in the House of Lords, in his ruling in the Woolmington v. DPP case in 1935. 9 His speech,
known as “Viscount Sankey’s Golden Thread Speech”, read as follows:
Throughout the web of the English Criminal Law one golden thread is always to be
seen that it  is  the duty of the prosecution to prove the prisoner’s  guilt  […].  No
matter what the charge or where the trial, the principle that the prosecution must
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prove  the  guilt  of  the  prisoner  is  part  of  the  common  law  of  England  and  no
attempt to whittle it down can be entertained. [Viscount Sankey’s Golden Thread
Speech 1935: n. pag.]
35 In Western cultures, this metaphor carries highly positive connotations having to do with
gold,  a  valued  metal,  and  with  Ariana’s  Thread.  The  “Golden  Thread”  is  thus  an
unmistakable way to find the right path, the only possible path as a matter of fact, in the
complex web (or labyrinth) of criminal law. It also describes a concept which is, itself,
worded metaphorically – but in a way that is so embedded in legal language that we
hardly notice the metaphor: “the burden of proof is on the accusation.” This striking,
culturally efficient metaphor has presumably played a significant role in spreading the
key legal notion of the presumption of innocence in Common Law countries.10 Indeed,
metaphors have the ability to create “new meaning, or perhaps, new principles” as Klinck
[1991: 360] suggested (quoted by Galonnier, [2000: §12]).
36 Similarly, Viscount Sankey’s statements in Edward v. Canada (known as “the Persons Case”
11) set out, through another metaphor, a doctrine of constitutional interpretation that has
become a foundation of Canadian constitutional law. This is what Viscount Sankey – who
was then Lord Chancellor – declared:
The Canadian Constitution is a living tree capable of growth and expansion within
its natural limits. [Viscount Sankey 1929: n. pag.]
37 The  same  metaphor  was  partly  used  by  Sir  Pollock  in  his  historical  account  of  the
Common Law (I will develop Sir Pollock’s account in part two of this paper):
The Common Law is […] a living and active law. [Sir Pollock 1912: 60]
38 Keeping in mind what I wrote earlier about trees – they never really die – the metaphor
could  be  deemed  slightly  redundant.  However,  the  gerund  “living”  insists  upon  the
evolutionary quality of the text so that the metaphor meets its goal: the Constitution
should be interpreted as changing with the times, not as a text frozen in its original
meaning. The efficiency of this metaphor is such that a doctrine has been called after it:
The living tree doctrine is a doctrine of constitutional interpretation that says that
a constitution is organic and must be read in a broad and progressive manner so as
to adapt it to the changing times. [The Free Dictionary online]
39 This metaphor is so powerful that it is still used today. In his lecture, Lord Justice Laws
[2012: 5 §9] highlights the evolutionary nature of the common law by saying that some
precedents “flourish like the green bay tree” – an evergreen generally used as a symbol of
prosperity.  Lord  Justice  Laws  [2012:  6  §10]  completes  the  metaphor  by  making  a
comparison with Darwinian evolution (“The principle which survive […] are the laws best
fitted for their environment”) and concludes [2012: 6 §11] that: “This legal version of
natural selection suggests the first element, evolution” (this first element refers to his
fourfold methodology of the common law). The opponents of the “living tree doctrine”
cannot even contradict it by extending the metaphor by means of the adjective “dead”, if
we admit that the tree image is associated with eternal longevity. As a matter of fact, they
use literal language (“original meaning”). Such language is not difficult to grasp but is
deprived of any metaphorical power.
40 One such power is to label a concept in an easy-to-memorise way and make it sound so
familiar  that  it  is  likely  to  take  root  not  only  in  legal  language  but  in  non-specific
language as well. This is the case, for instance, of the religious metaphor of the “fruit of
the poisonous tree” which has given its name to a doctrine in the United States. It refers
to illegally procured evidence which, as a consequence, is inadmissible in a court of law.
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Clearly, the evidence is seen as a poisonous apple that will kill the case of whoever has
used/eaten it. Thanks to its metaphorical wording exempt of any legal term that could
make it unpalatable to the average person – this is precisely one of the points of using
metaphors in law – it becomes easy, then, to mention it in popular media such as movies
(as is the case in Fracture [2007] for example) all the more so as it concerns a fairly banal
situation that any American citizen can relate to. The American society is not only one of
the most religious in the world (“the fruit of the poisonous tree” will ring a biblical bell
with most Americans), it is also one that is allegedly the most acquainted with its legal
system.  Legal  (and non legal)  fiction may play a  non-negligible  role  in  this.  We can
assume that a virtuous circle is at work here: a legal concept can readily be referred to in
fiction because it is worded metaphorically, and because it is mentioned people are likely
to remember it, or at least accept it in a fiction that is not purposely legal12 – they are
certainly  more  likely  to  welcome  it  than,  say,  “extrajudicial  evidence”,  “extraneous
evidence” or “rebuttal evidence” which sound a lot more technical.
 
1.4. Metaphors and the Law: A Perfect Match?
41 The magic of metaphors is that D1 and D2 merge in an apparently perfect match that
brings them together by virtue of their common points. However, a metaphor can shed
light only on a limited part of a concept, leaving the rest in the dark. In this way, the
«agrarian  metaphor  in  intellectual  property  discourse  highlights  only  the  individual
nature of  creation and the interest  that  a labourer has in the product of  his  or her
labour», conveniently hiding “the effect of excessive copyright protection on the ‘market-
place of ideas’” Loughlan notes [2006: 224 & 225].
42 Yet, is it useful or necessary to clarify everything? A metaphor fully plays its role when it
makes it easy to grasp the gist of a concept. The merging of D1 and D2 is necessarily
partial. It is also an illusion. It does not tell the truth, but a truth. When we say, as Lakoff
& Johnson [2003: 7-8] underlined, “ARGUMENT IS WAR” or “TIME IS MONEY”, the verb “be”
emphasises the similarities between subject and predicate. Nonetheless, any similarity is
“the place where identical and different aspects meet” as Ricœur [1975: 250] explains.13 As
early as the Preface to his book [1975: 11], he notes that “metaphoric ‘be’ means both ‘is
not’ and ‘is like’.”14 This is what we tend to forget, in particular when the metaphor is
“dead” and as such easily overlooked. D1 is a filter – and perhaps even a philtre15 – which
at best affects what we perceive of D2 and at worst utterly distorts our perception of it.
 
2. Metaphors as manipulative and misleading devices
43 A metaphor cannot but convey a point of view imposed by the source domain. This is not
specific to the interpretation of metaphors in law. It is typical of the interpretation of any
metaphor in any kind of context.
 
2.1. Decoding is necessary
44 For a metaphor to work properly, the recipient has to be able to identify “where the
metaphor takes place” as summarised by Morier [1981: 675]16, that is to say where D1 and
D2 share a common ground. This is why:
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The  formula  A ∩ B = ∅ equates  with  an  absence  of  metaphor  or  a  senseless
comparison. [Morier 1981: 677]
45 Morier specifies  that  the mathematical  sign ∩  symbolises  an intersection point. The
domain  chosen  as  the  reference  for  the  comparison  is  therefore  essential  as  “it
determines the elements put forward: it works as a filter” Morier [1981: 677] concludes.
Once this filter has been identified, the recipient needs to pick up which, among its many
characteristics,  must be taken into account.  For instance,  the image of a tree can be
interpreted differently within the same culture. In the Judaeo-Christian world, it might
conjure  up  the  “poisonous  tree”  even  to  people  who  are  not  particularly  religious
probably  even  before  they  will  think  of  the  natural  characteristics  of  a  tree.  The
metaphors cited earlier work smoothly thanks to the adjectives that narrow the scope of
the noun (“poisonous” and “living”), both of which are “naturally” or “culturally” readily
associated with the noun “tree”. As a consequence, decoding them requires a minimum
amount  of  effort.  In  other  cases  though,  it  is  more  difficult,  not  to  say  downright
impossible, to decipher the metaphor if the recipient does not possess the prerequisite
knowledge to do so, be it legal, historical or linguistic. In any case, once the relevant
elements have been duly selected, D1 plays its role as an access facilitator to D2 by laying
down an interpretative framework. This framework automatically narrows the way the
targeted concept is understood. It follows that a metaphor can be used as a powerful tool
to impose how a notion is interpreted.
 
2.2. Manipulative metaphors
46 The  aim  of  the  metaphor  may  not  be  simply  pedagogic:  it  can  be  misleading  and
manipulate the recipient. Why? Because language mirrors the way we see the world and
conversely, the way we look at things depends on how we speak of them. In other words,
language can narrow or at least circumscribe our understanding of reality – a feature that
logically  also  characterises  metaphors,  which  shape our  thoughts  as  scholarship  has
shown in the past twenty years. For instance, if we speak of something in terms of war,
we consider it as such (see Lakoff & Johnson 2003). “These metaphors, while originally
mythical or aspirational, become real and influence the way litigators think and behave.
In addition to reflecting reality, they shape it”, Thornburg [1995: 226] points out. This is
why this author argues [1995: 228 & 280] that if we want to change the way we conceive of
a trial, we have to change the metaphors attached to it:
[…] we [should] adopt and nurture new metaphors that will emphasize those parts
of the adversary system that are obscured by the currently dominant metaphors of
war, sports and sex. [Thornburg 1995: 228]
47 As a consequence, metaphors are able to steer our perception of reality and notably of
legal truth. Let us consider, for instance, the field of intellectual property. Loughlan [2006
& 2008] has noticed that three metaphor clusters are to be found in this area of the law.
One is  the agrarian/bucolic  metaphors  which present creations  as  the “fruit”  of  the
inventor’s work that he/she is entitled to reap: “authors and inventors [are compared] to
farmers who ‘reap’ and ‘sow’ and deserve the ‘fruits’ of their labours” she writes [2006:
211  & 213].  This  metaphor  is  reinforced by  that  of  the  “sweat  of  the  brow”,  which
confirms the idea that any work deserves to be duly rewarded. “The agrarian metaphor
is” she says [2006: 221] “an important linguistic resource for the originality doctrine in
copyright law.” It follows that if this “fruit” is reaped by someone else, that person has
illegitimately  taken  what  did  not  belong  to  them:  it  is  theft,  plain  and  simple.  The
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conclusion sounds logical and perfectly understandable – which is precisely the point of
such  a  metaphor  as  anyone  must  feel  concerned  by  this  “fact”.  Hence  the  second
metaphor cluster that is pervasive in intellectual property: that of “theft” or “robbery” –
an even worse comparison since robbery implies violence. This, in turn, leads to another
family of metaphors, as it appears ethical that a thief’s actions must be fought harshly so
as  to  preserve  someone’s  rightful  “property”  (the  word  itself  points  to  a  reification
process applied to an otherwise abstract creation):
[…] the ‘pirate-predator-parasite’ lend legitimacy and even urgency to another set
of  metaphors,  namely,  the  metaphors  of  battle,  or  the  armed  and  righteous
aggressive action to be taken against the ‘pirates’. [Loughlan 2006: 219]
48 We are back to armed Lady Justice, her sword and shield in hand. But how legitimate is
that? Is it not mere lobbying on the part of an industry that does whatever it takes to
protect its interests? At any rate, some scholars have questioned the string of negative
connotations entailed by the original “bucolic” metaphors. Loughlan’s statement is very
clear in this respect:
[…] the use of the language of theft in the discourse of intellectual property ought
at  least  to  be  constantly  noted  for  what  it  is,  an  inaccurate  and  manipulative
distortion of legal and moral reality. [Loughlan 2008: 2]
49 She exemplifies this with an everyday situation:
When  the  background  authoritative  voice  in  the  MPAA  film  […]  intones  that
‘downloading  a  pirated  film  is  stealing’,  no  statement  of  law  is  being  made.
[Loughlan 2008: 5]
50 Maybe the metaphor is not – cynically enough – meant to manipulate, but there is no
denying that its effects are to present an aspect of a reality as if it were the only possible
one. 
51 This communicative and manipulative power of metaphors can be even subtler. It is at
work in another, commonplace statement that says that a “company/corporation is a
person.”  The  analogical  process  triggered  by  the  verb  “be”  transfers  some  qualities
typical of “a person” (D1) onto “a company/corporation” (D2). For most people, contrary
to an animal a human being can laugh and can reason. The brain will immediately filter
out the former quality as it obviously cannot be applied to a company and will focus on
the latter.  Reason means the capacity to act  and the responsibility for one’s actions.
Indeed, a corporation can act like a real person (sign a contract, for example, or be sued)
but as it is not made of flesh and bones, it is not a “natural” person but a “legal” person.
This semasiological approach (going from the words towards the concept) seems to work
fine. However, there is more to the metaphor. According to Greenwood, it is not just a
person, it is seen as a citizen. “The consequences are dramatic”, he says [2005: 3] because
these “citizens” end up being granted more rights than regular citizens he contends
[2005:  4].  Furthermore,  by  defining  a  corporation  as  a  single  person,  the  metaphor
conceals the “groupness” and “the internal difficulties of aggregate decision-making” and
claims [2005: 15], instead, “that a firm is a single, unified, pre-Freudian, actor.” In other
words, the metaphor misleads the recipients by making them accept that a company is a
kind of “super person” or “super citizen”. Some people are even prone to compare them
to... superheroes: “[…] the thought of corporations as superheroes – rather than greed-
driven  villains  of  commerce  –  has  some  appeal  in  the  environmentally  and  socially
challenged society we have created”, journalist Tyler Hamilton wrote on the website of
Corporate Knights, under the title “Can corporations be superheroes?”
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52 Other metaphors lead to misconceptions of legal concepts. One of these is that which has
led to the conception of the Common Law as a woman, possibly to trigger respect towards
it, but not only.
 
2.3. Misleading metaphors – the gender of the law
53 Is the law female, as the metaphor “our Lady the Common Law” suggests? It was coined
by  Sir  Pollock,  an  authoritative  historian  of  English  Law,  in  his  Carpentier  lectures
entitled “the genius of the common law” delivered at Columbia University in 1911, in
which he gave an historical account of the development of this system of law. Over time a
lot of writers have adopted the feminine image to speak of the Common Law, probably
because of the force of the metaphor and the authority of its author.17 One notices that
the noun “genius” in the lecture title initiates the personification process. “Our Lady”
finishes it off by determining the gender: the Law is a “she”. But she is not any woman:
not only is she a genius, she is a goddess. A parallelism with Themis/Iustitia can and must
be made here. As Sir Pollock stated early in his speech:
She is […] armed and expectant […]. She belongs to the kindred of Homer’s gods […].
She can be jealous with Hera, merciless with Artemis, and astute with Athena [...].
[Sir Pollock 1912: 6]
54 For that matter, the definition of “our Lady’s” justice brings to mind that of Themis: 
Her  justice  is  fair  as  the  moon,  clear  as  the  sun  and  terrible  as  an  army with
banners. [Sir Pollock 1912: 59]
55 Indeed,  along  with  this  “goddess”  metaphor,  the  author  also  widely  uses  warfare
metaphors: “She has faced many foes and diverse manner of weapons”, he says [1912: 7].
“We have to consider the enemies of law and legal order in modern times”, he adds [1912:
28]. “She looks for trusty servants who will stand by her in the day of need. She demands
fearless and independent judges drawn from a fearless and independent Bar […]. If our
lady’s servants are not of that spirit, all the learning of all their books will not save them
from disgrace or her realm from ruin. If they are, we shall never see the enemy whom she
and they will be afraid to speak with in the gate”, he asserts as if to drive the point home
[1912: 34]. The table of contents leaves no doubt as to the warlike and godlike aspects of
the English Common Law in Sir Pollock’s eyes at the time: “Our Lady and Her Knights”,
“The Giants and The Gods”, “Surrebutter Castle”, “Enemies in the Gate”, “Rescue and
Ransom”,  “Alliance  and  Conquest”,  “Perils  of  the  Market-Place”  and  “The  Perpetual
Quest”. Some writers such as Legrand [1992b: 945] have pointed out that the feminine
metaphor is mainly meant to show English lawyers’ respect for the Law. This view is
supported by the use of the word “servants” as well as the fact that Sir Pollock declared in
his  speech  that  “our  Lady  the  Common  Law”  deserves  to  be  done  homage  to  and
worshiped.
56 Linguistically however, when it comes to translating in particular, the debate is still open
as no evidence proves this standpoint is correct – no more than the opposite standpoint
for  that  matter.  Historically,  “common  law”  stems  from masculine  noun  phrases  in
Norman French (comun  dreit,  commun  dreit,  commune  droit)  as  well  as  feminine  noun
phrases (lex communis, commune lei, commen ley). Though it would seem that the feminine
phrases were more often used than their masculine counterparts, this is no reason to
decide that the feminine should be prevalent today Legrand argues. As a matter of fact,
he claims that the masculine article should be used in French (where the feminine article
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prevails in translations), as is the case in other languages such as Italian and Spanish
[1992b: 945] where the noun is not gender neutral as it is in English. The reason for this is
that «law» refers to droit (masculine) here and not to loi (feminine). Therefore, the phrase
should read le Common Law. Yet, the feminine metaphor dies hard, as exemplified by
Richard Cosgrove’s book title Our Lady the Common Law: An Anglo-American Legal Community,
1870-1930 (New York: New York University Press,  1987) or this striking quote from an
English  judge  that closes  Galonnier’s  article  [2000:  §27]:  “The  common  law  has  not
suffered a menopause and is not past the age of child bearing.” She is clearly a woman
(forever?) untouched by the ravages of time.
57 Is the metaphor really misleading? Yes, in so far as it presents for a fact something that is
not supported by any historical proof and closes a debate that is still very much alive.
This is what metaphors do. They present as an objective fact something that is merely a
truncated truth, the goal being to reach a specific purpose. We can consider the goal as
met when the metaphors have been properly decoded. However, this is far from always
the case. A number of them are hard to decipher and as such are likely to totally blur the
message... or do they?
 
3. Metaphors as a source of obscurity?
58 Some writers wish to eradicate metaphors in legal speech on the grounds that they make
the  understanding  of  legal  concepts  more  complicated,  which  defeats  their  alleged
purpose.  Many  among  these  writers  support  their  point  with  examples  of  piled  up,
unrelated  metaphors  which  draw  from  different  domains  to  speak  of  D2,  become
intertwined and result in incoherent speech that obscures the message. However, I will
set aside these “tortured” metaphors as Mellinkoff [1963: 26] calls them, because they are,
in fact, a misuse of this figure of speech. This being said, can it be claimed, as part of
Gardes Tamine’s article title [2007] states, that “lexicalised metaphors […] in specialised
languages hinder comprehension”?18 In other words,  these metaphors would blur the
message  altogether.  The  reason for  this  is  they  can be  difficult  to  decipher  [Gardes
Tamine 2007: 18] because most metaphors in English for specific purposes are lexicalised.
It turns out that a large number of them are impossible to figure out if one does not have
a minimum amount of knowledge in the legal field concerned. Some can be guessed, such
as “cloud on title” (or “clouded title”).19 But others cannot. Among those are metaphors
resorting to very common semantic fields such as colours (“blue-sky law”, “blue laws”20
or  “blue  ribbon  jury”),  cleanness  or  dirt  (“dirt  for  dirt’s  sake”,  “clean  and  neat
conditions”),  body  parts  (“corruption  of  blood”,  “the  Chancellor’s  foot”),  cosmology
(“cosmic law”), death (“dead copy”, “dead pledge”, “civil death”), animals and colours
(“yellow dog contract”), family relationships (“son of Sam law”) to name but a few (most
of these metaphors are borrowed from Mellinkoff [1963]).
59 Yet, I would like to ask the opposite question: would a concept be easier to understand if
it were defined literally? Something essential should be kept in mind: a technical concept
evoked  metaphorically  does  not  lose  its  technicality.  A  metaphor  does  not  erase
conceptual complexities. It merely offers a signifier that is less dry and that opens the
door,  however slightly,  to part of  the concept.  Sometimes though, the door opens to
darkness for want of knowledge on the part of the recipient. However, literal language
would surely fare no better. Firstly, because it would take a longer explanatory sentence.
For  instance,  let  us  consider  the  “clean  hands”  metaphor:  “The  language  chosen
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expresses in the vivid, concrete terms of daily human life, an abstract principle of legal
reasoning about denial of relief to a plaintiff whose own conduct has been improper”,
Loughlan [2006: 213-214] explains. Or “The Silver Platter Doctrine” which, as Mellinkoff
[1963: 441] defines it, is “The law of the sanctimonious federal – his hands unsoiled by the
illegal search, yet claiming the damning proceeds – could be remembered more easily as
the silver platter doctrine” (Mellinkoff specifies that the metaphor was drafted by Justice
Frankfurter in 1949 in Lusting v. United States, 338 U.S. 74, 78-79). The metaphor remains
more efficient than a literal explanation (for instance: “the exclusionary rule – valid until
1960  –  that  allows  federal  courts  to  accept  evidence  seized  illegally  by  state”).  It
highlights the essence, or what matters most, i.e. the evidence is served to the courts on a
silver platter. Some elements are missing, it is not perfect but partial as most metaphors
are, but at least the core of the doctrine is easily remembered and presented in a few
words based upon a well-known phrase belonging to everyday language. This illustrates
perfectly what Berger argues:
[…]  even  the  most  conceptual  and  theoretical  ideas  find  explication through
analogy to common phenomena. [Berger 2002: 34]
60 Secondly, literal language would not express complex concepts in a less complex manner
than metaphors do. It would rather be the opposite. As Morra, Rossi & Bazzanella put it:
A metaphor is not a way of saying something that could be said literally, it is rather
a  productive  tool  useful  for  categorising  experiences  or  ideas  that  cannot  be
described through pure referential expressions and literal language. [Morra, Rossi
& Bazzanella 2006: 144-145]
61 The word “obscurity” in the title deserves some discussion. The question is: who are such
metaphors obscure to? No doubt to anyone who does not have the required legal and/or
cultural  knowledge.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  “obscurity  is  only  rarely  a  barrier  to
understanding”, Charnock [2006: 65] argues. The obscurity created by some metaphors is
indeed relative. Metaphors use plain words but they are not plain language. They belong
to  symbolic  language.  A  language  that  the  average  person  is  not  always  likely  to
understand  or  is  not  even  meant  to  understand.  For  instance,  the  “clean  hands”
metaphor or the “silver platter doctrine” metaphor refer to very specific concepts that
only lawyers are expected to master. As such, not only is such wording not detrimental to
comprehension  but  it  also  offers  the  additional  advantage  of  being  not  only
“rememberable but memorable” [Mellinkoff, 1963: 440].
 
Conclusion: “Metaphor, in short, is here in law and it is
here to stay”21
62 Most metaphors in English for Law are lexicalised.  As such,  they belong to the legal
lexicon.  Their  aim is  to  present  legal  concepts  in  a  memorable,  vibrant  and concise
manner that uses plain vocabulary and establishes a comparison with a domain that is
culturally easy to relate to. Yet, let us not be fooled by a plain English signifier. The use of
such vocabulary does not mean that technicality is eradicated from the concept. Those
which are less technical are efficiently conveyed through a metaphor. But those which
are complex are conveyed just as efficiently.
63 The point is not to make legal concepts accessible to everybody (though some do). It is to
make them strike the mind. Even if  I  do not know precisely what the “Silver Platter
Doctrine” is, I can figure out what the general concept is about, however complex it is.
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Besides,  the metaphor is likely to sink in. In the same way, an American lawyer will
presumably  remember  the  meaning  attached  to  it  precisely  because  it  is  drafted
metaphorically. This is why metaphors are useful in law. They successfully play a role
that literal language would not perform any better and probably not as well for it would
lack what makes metaphors so powerful. As such, the law gains more than it loses in
using them, as long as they are used properly. What is proper use? One that does not
collide with another, unrelated metaphor whether it is to describe the same concept or a
different concept. Let us not forget that the analogical process is indirect and requires
some decoding effort. A text crammed with metaphors would probably be as unpalatable
as one crammed with technical terms. As Antoine de Rivarol beautifully put it: “he who
would speak of everything in technical terms should be kept at arm’s length.”22 The same
could be said of whoever would constantly speak in metaphorical terms. But misuse aside,
metaphors are probably one of the most efficient stylistic tools to communicate legal
concepts. They do have flaws, which should not be overlooked or underestimated, but
they remain a powerful communicative linguistic device whose advantages far outweigh
their disadvantages.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
    
 
Books & Articles
BERGER Benjamin L., “Trial by Metaphor: Rhetoric, Innovation, and the Juridical Text”, Court
Review, The Journal of the American Judges Association, Vol. 39, n° 3, Paper 133, 2002: 1-9.
http://digitalcommons.unl.edu/ajacourtreview/133. Web. 7 March 2013.
BINNIE Ian, “Interpreting the constitution: the living tree vs original meaning“, Options politiques/
Policy Options, « Freetrade/Le libre échange », Montréal: Institut de Recherche en Politiques
Publiques, 2007, 104-110.
www.irpp.org/po/archive/oct07/binnie.pdf. Web. 26 Feb. 2013.
CHARNOCK Ross, “Clear Ambiguity”, in WAGNER Anne & CACCIA GUIDI-FAHI Sophie (Eds), Legal
Language and the Search for Clarity – Practice and Tools, Bern: Peter Lang, 2006 : 65-103.
CORNU Gérard, Vocabulaire juridique, Paris : PUF, 1992 [1987].
COSGROVE Richard A., Our Lady The Common Law, New York & London: New York University Press,
1987.
CUNILERRA DOMÈNECH Montserrat, « Les métaphores dans le discours politique : tendances de
traduction à l’espagnol », Synergies Espagne n°3 « Contrastes linguistiques et communication »,
2010 : 107-117. 
http://ressources-cla.univ-fcomte.fr/gerflint/Espagne3/montserrat.pdf. Web. 6 Aug. 2012.
FAIRGRIEVE Duncan & MUIR WATT Horatia, Common Law et tradition civiliste, Paris : PUF, 2006.
Metaphors in English for Law: Let Us Keep Them!
Lexis, 8 | 2014
15
FUMAROLI Marc, Le livre des métaphores, Paris : Robert Laffont, 2012.
GALONNIER Bernard, «La métaphore dans les jugements anglais : nature et fonction», Asp 27-30,
2000, 325-335. 
http://asp.revues.org/2260. Web. 16 April 2013.
GARDES TAMINE Joëlle, « Les métaphores dans la langue et dans les langues de spécialité : un
obstacle à la compréhension », 2007. 
http://ressources-cla.univ-fcomte.fr/gerflint/Italie3/joelle.pdf. Web. 5 Aug. 2012.
GIAUFRET Anna & ROSSI Micaela, « Métaphores terminologiques, circulation des savoirs et contact
entre langues », Signes, Discours et Sociétés [online] 10, «La métaphore dans les discours
spécialisés», 2 Feb. 2013. 
http://www.revue-signes.info/document.php?id=2928 ISSN 1308-8378. Web. 2 March 2013.
GINGRAS Anne-Marie, « Les métaphores dans le langage politique », Politique et société n°30, 1996,
159-171.
www.erudit.org/revue/ps/1996/v/n30/040037ar.pdf. Web. 6 Aug. 2012.
GOMBARO Antonio, SACCO Rodolfo & VOGEL Louis, Le droit de l’occident et d’ailleurs, Paris : LGDJ, 2011.
GREENWOOD Daniel J.H., “Introduction to the Metaphors in Corporate Law”, Seattle Journal for Social 
Justice, Utah Legal Series Paper 05-13, 2005: 1-17. 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=797564. Web. 7 July 2012.
HOUBERT Frédéric, « Caught in the Web of the Law : le traducteur juridique face à la métaphore »,
2008 : 1-15. 
http://www.initerm.net/post/2011/05/18/Les-metaphores-juridiques. Web. 1 June 2012.
LAKOFF George & JOHNSON Mark, Metaphors We Live By, London: The University of Chicago Press,
2003 [1980].
LEGRAND Pierre, Common Law d’un siècle à l’autre, Québec : Yvon Blais, 1992a.
LEGRAND Pierre, « Pour le common law », in Revue internationale de droit comparé. Vol. 44 N° 4,
Octobre-décembre 1992, 1992b : 941-947. 
http://www.persee.fr/web/revues/home/prescript/article/
ridc_0035-3337_1992_num_44_4_4577. Web. 1 March 2013.
LÉVY-ULLMANN Henri, Le système juridique de l’Angleterre, coll. « Les introuvables – droit comparé »,
Paris : Éditions Panthéon-Assas, 1999.
LOUGHLAN Patricia, « Pirates, Parasites, Reapers, Sowers, Fruits, Foxes… The Metaphors Of
Intellectual Property », Legal Studies Research Paper n° 06/01, Sydney Law Review, Vol. 28, n° 2, 2006
: 211-226.
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Papers.cfm?abstract_id=919560. Web. 24 Feb. 2013.
LOUGHLAN Patricia, “‘You wouldn’t steal a car’, Intellectual Property and the Language of Theft”, 
Sydney Law School Research Paper n° 08/35, European Intellectual Property Review, Vol. 29, n° 10, 2008:
401-405, 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1120585. Web. 4 Nov. 2012.
MELLINKOFF David, The Language of the Law, Boston, Toronto: Little, Brown and Company, 1963. 
MORIER Henri, Dictionnaire de poétique et de rhétorique, Paris : Presses Universitaires de France, 1981
[1961].
Metaphors in English for Law: Let Us Keep Them!
Lexis, 8 | 2014
16
MORRA Lucia, ROSSI Piercarlo & BAZZANELLA Carla, “Metaphor in language: Clarity or Obscurity?”,
in WAGNER Anne & CACCIA GUIDI-FAHI Sophie (Eds), Legal Language and the Search for Clarity – Practice
and Tools, Bern: Peter Lang, 2006: 141-174.
PICARD Étienne, Dictionnaire de la culture juridique, Paris : PUF, 2003.
PICOTTE Jacques, « Apport de la jurilinguistique à la lexicographie jurilinguistique : l’exemple du 
Juridictionnaire », in SNOW Gerard & VANDERLINDEN Jacques (Eds), Français juridique et science du droit
, Brussels : Bruylant, 1995: 295-310.
POLLOCK Frederic, The Genius of the Common Law, Columbia: Columbia University Press, 1911. 
http://www.912freedomlibrary.org/custom-1/Genius of comm. Web. 7 June 2013.
RICOEUR Paul, La métaphore vive, Paris : Le Seuil, 1975.
ROUETTE Georges, « Le genre de ‘Common Law’ », in SNOW Gerard & VANDERLINDEN Jacques (Eds), 
Français juridique et science du droit, Brussels : Bruylant, 1995: 311-325.
THORNBURG Elizabeth, “Metaphors Matter: How Images of Battle, Sports and Sex Shape the
Adversary System”, Wisconsin Women’s Law Journal, Vol. 10, 1995: 225-281. 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1006305. Web. 24 Feb. 2013.
TRIM Richard, Metaphor Networks – the comparative evolution of comparative language, New York :
Palgrave Macmillan, 2007.
STIRN Bernard, FAIRGRIEVE Duncan & GUYOMAR Mattias, Droits et libertés en France et au Royaume Uni,
Paris : Odile Jacob, 2006.
 
Dictionaries
CAMPBELL BLACK, Henry, Black’s Law Dictionary, Minnesota: West Publishing Company, 1991 [1983].
The Free Dictionary, Legal Dictionary, http://legal-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/, Web. 3
Sept. 2012.
NOTES
1. “If A=B represented a perfect identity, then it would not be a comparison […] nothing would be
stated other than A=A: ‘an ant is [like] an ant’” [Morier 1981: 674] / « Si A=B représentait une
identité absolue, ce ne serait plus une comparaison […] on n’affirmerait rien d’autre que A=A :
‛une fourmi est [comme] une fourmi’ ».
2. Mellinkoff [1936: 515] develops this point further.
3. For instance, Ricœur [1975: 216] states that: “there are no […] metaphors in dictionaries”/« il
n’y a pas […] de métaphores dans les dictionnaires ».
4. This point is developed by Gombaro, Sacco & Vogel [2011: 45-46].
5. « Sans discontinuité, le droit positif remonte dans l’histoire jusqu’aux temps immémoriaux […]
en Angleterre. On peut même aller jusqu’à dire que plus une règle est ancienne, plus elle a de
poids. L’autorité s’attache à l’ancienneté ».
6. See Houbert [2008: 5] for more detail.
7. Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v. Wednesbury Corporation [1948] 1 KB 223.
8. « Dans toute son histoire, le Common Law tout à la fois change et ne change pas, exactement
comme un fleuve qui coule, qui reste le même en n’étant jamais le même ». It is interesting to
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notice that Picard uses the masculine genre to speak of the Common Law when other writers opt
for the feminine. I will return to this.
9. Woolmington was charged with killing his wife who had left him a month earlier. He claimed
the gun had fired accidentally. The issue at stake was the statement of law in ‘Foster’s Crown
Law’ (1762) according to which “where a death occurred it  is presumed to be murder unless
proven otherwise.”
10. See Houbert [2008: 10] for more detail.
11. A case “where the courts in Canada embarrassed themselves by holding, in accordance with
the ‘original meaning’ of Section 32 of the Constitution Act, 1867, that women were not qualified
for appointment to the Senate because they were not ‘qualified persons’”, Judge Binnie of the
Supreme Court of Canada [2007: 105] wrote.
12. A study of metaphors in fiction in general, and in legal fiction more specifically, could prove
helpful in checking this hypothesis.
13. « Toute ressemblance est le] lieu de rencontre entre le même et le différent ».
14. « Le ‘est’ métaphorique signifie à la fois ‘n’est pas’ et ‘est comme’ ».
15. A charm potion that beguiles.
16. « [le] lieu de la métaphore ». Morier notes that this “place” is sometimes called “the heart” or
“the knot” or “the nexus”.
17. This argument is developed by Rouhette [1995: 311].
18. « […] les métaphores lexicalisées […] dans les langues de spécialité » sont « un obstacle à la
compréhension ». 
19. It is “an outstanding claim or encumbrance which, if valid, would affect or impair the title of
the owner of a particular estate” (Black’s Law Dictionary, 1991: 175). It is interesting to note that
the action to claim the estate in question is also named metaphorically. It is a “quiet title action”
defined as follows: “A quiet title suit is also called a suit to remove a cloud […]. [It is] a lawsuit to
establish a  party’s  title  to real  property against  anyone and everyone,  and thus «quiet» any
challenges or claims to the title” (The Free Dictionary online).
20. “A statute [is] called a ‘Blue Sky Law’ because it pertains to speculative schemes which have
no more basis than so many feet of blue sky”, Black’s Law Dictionary explains [1991: 118]. Blue Laws
are “statutes regulating entertainment activities, work, and commerce on Sundays. Such laws
have  their  origin  in  colonial  New  England”,  according  to  Black’s  Law  Dictionary [1991:  118].
Hypotheses have been put forward to account for the adjective «blue». One is the assumption
that the first of such laws were printed on blue paper or that they were compiled in books with a
blue cover. The metaphor would therefore be based upon a synecdoche.
21. This quote is borrowed from Loughlan [2006: 216].
22. « […] celui qui parlerait de tout en termes techniques serait un homme à fuir », « Prospectus
du nouveau dictionnaire », Discours préliminaire du nouveau dictionnaire de la langue française, first
part, Hamburg, P.F. Fauche, 1797. Quoted by Fumaroli [op. cit: 6].
ABSTRACTS
A large number of legal concepts is expressed through metaphors, exemplifing the Conceptual
Metaphor Theory created by Lakoff & Johnson. Indeed, the law often resorts to metaphors in
order to allow us to understand an abstract and/or unknown concept in terms of another that is
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concrete  and/or familiar  (the metaphor of  the “living tree” to  describe  some aspects  of  the
Canadian constitution is a case in point). The law itself is often compared to an object (“to break
the law”, “a law breaker”) or to a person (“Our Lady the Common Law”, “the arm of the law”,
“the eye of the law”). What is more, some metaphors have allegedly contributed to developing
new legal concepts (for instance the metaphor of “the golden thread” was used to evoke the then
new notion of the presumption of innocence in Canada).
However, though it cannot be denied that metaphors are useful to shed light on legal concepts,
the interpretation of the latter is necessarily biased because the compared concept is always
circumscribed to the comparing concept which, besides, tends to present the interpretation as
the only possible one. This way, some metaphors can be used as manipulative tools.
Finally, the cognitive function of metaphors may be limited: on the one hand, some metaphors
may remain obscure even to the native speaker (“blue sky law”, “thin skull doctrine”), on the
other hand, others may be misleading either because they are ambiguous or because they suggest
(impose?) one vision of the world that excludes all the others.
Un grand nombre de concepts juridiques est  exprimé au moyen de métaphores.  Leur emploi
illustre  la  théorie  de  la  métaphore  conceptuelle  élaborée  par  Lakoff  &  Johnson :  le  droit  a
fréquemment  recours  à  la  métaphore  afin  de  faire  comprendre  un  concept  inconnu  et/ou
abstrait  au  moyen  d’un  autre  connu et/ou  concret  (par  exemple  la  métaphore  de  « l’arbre
vivant »  pour  décrire  certains  aspects  de  la  constitution  canadienne).  Le  droit  lui-même est
comparé à un objet (« to break the law », « law breaker ») ou bien à une personne (« Our Lady the
Common Law », « the arm of the law », « the eye of the law »). En outre, certaines métaphores
auraient  contribué  au  développement  de  nouveaux  concepts  (telle  celle  du  « fil  d’or »  pour
évoquer la présomption d’innocence au Canada).
Cependant, si la métaphore semble indispensable au droit, elle est également un filtre qui oriente
l’interprétation  des  concepts  juridiques :  le  comparé  est  circonscrit  au  comparant  qui,  de
surcroît, présente l’interprétation comme la seule possible. Certaines métaphores peuvent alors
être utilisées à fins de manipulation.
Enfin, la fonction cognitive des métaphores se heurte à des limites : d’une part, certaines peuvent
demeurer obscures,  y  compris  aux locuteurs natifs  (« blue sky law »,  « thin skull  doctrine »),
d’autre part, elles peuvent induire en erreur soit parce qu’elles sont ambiguës, soit parce qu’elles
proposent (imposent ?) une vision du monde à l’exclusion de toute autre.
INDEX
Mots-clés: métaphores mortes, concepts juridiques, visée pédagogique, interprétation des
concepts juridiques
Keywords: dead metaphors, legal concepts, pedagogic power, interpretation of legal concepts
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